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Abstract
Digital open source information has been heralded for its democratizing potential,
insofar as it allows access to a much broader range of sources and voices than would
normally be consulted through traditional methods of information gathering for
international criminal investigations. It also helps to overcome some of the physical
access barriers that are commonplace in international criminal investigations. At a
time when the use of digital open source information is becoming more widespread,
this article warns of the cognitive and technical biases that can impact upon two
key stages of an investigation: finding relevant information and analysing that in-
formation. At the information-gathering stage, there are particular crimes, regions
and groups of people whose experiences are more likely to be overlooked or hidden in
digital open source investigations. When it comes to analysing digital open source
information, there is a danger that cognitive and technical biases may influence
which information is deemed most relevant and useful to an international criminal
investigation, and how that information is interpreted. This article proposes some
steps that can be taken to mitigate these risks.
* Professor of Law, Swansea University, UK. [Yvonne.McDermottRees@swansea.ac.uk]
** Executive Director and Lecturer-in-Residence, Human Rights Center, University of California,
Berkeley, USA. [kalexam@berkeley.edu]
*** Senior Lecturer, Human Rights Centre and School of Law, University of Essex, Colchester, UK.
[d.murray@essex.ac.uk]
This work was supported by the United Kingdom Economic and Social Research Council (grant
number ES/R00899X/1) as part of the OSR4Rights project. The authors thank Sam Dubberley,
Emma Irving, Nema Milaninia, and the anonymous reviewers for their feedback on an earlier
draft.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2021), 1 of 21 doi:10.1093/jicj/mqab006
 The Author(s) (2021). Published by Oxford University Press. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution,







qab006/6214619 by guest on 20 M
ay 2021
1. Introduction
Digital open source information1 — defined as information on the internet that
any member of the public can obtain by request, purchase or observation2 —
is revolutionizing the investigation and prosecution of international crimes.3
Nowhere is this more apparent than before the International Criminal Court
(ICC), where the Prosecutor has introduced new forms of digital open source
evidence in a number of cases.4 Satellite imagery, videos and photographs have
been used to identify particular sites in Mali,5 while social media evidence has
been introduced to show direct evidence of alleged violations,6 and to demon-
strate a claimed relationship between key individuals.7 Open source informa-
tion also plays an increasingly important role in the work of human rights
fact-finding missions, commissions of inquiry and other forms of investigation.8
Researchers have identified three key advantages to using digital open
source information for investigations. First, where direct access to crime sites
1 In this article, the terms open source information and open source evidence are distinguished,
with ‘evidence’ solely referring to materials submitted as part of a criminal process.
‘Information’ covers all other materials.
2 Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley/UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Berkeley Protocol on Open Source Investigations (‘Berkeley Protocol’), 1 December
2020, at 6–7; S. Dubberley, A. Koenig and D. Murray, ‘Introduction: The Emergence of Digital
Witness’, in S. Dubberley, A. Koenig and D. Murray (eds), Digital Witness: Using Open Source
Information for Human Rights Investigation, Documentation and Accountability (Oxford University
Press, 2020) 3, at 9.
3 M. Aksenova, M. Bergsmo and C. Stahn, ‘Non-Criminal Justice Fact-Work in the Age of
Accountability’, in M. Bergsmo and C. Stahn (eds), Quality Control in Fact-Finding (2nd edn.,
TOAEP, 2020) 1, at 9–10; E. Irving, ‘And So It Begins . . . Social Media Evidence in an ICC
Arrest Warrant’, Opinio Juris, 17 August 2017; A. Koenig et al., ‘Open Source Fact-Finding in
Preliminary Examinations’, in M. Bergsmo and C. Stahn (eds), Quality Control in Preliminary
Examination: Volume 2 (TOAEP, 2018) 681.
4 L. Freeman, ‘Prosecuting Atrocity Crimes with Open Source Evidence: Lessons from the
International Criminal Court’, in Dubberley, Koenig and Murray (eds), supra note 2, 48, at
52.
5 Transcript, Al Hassan (ICC-01/12-01/18-T-027-Red-ENG), Trial Chamber X, 21 September
2020; Judgment and Sentence, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-171), Trial Chamber VIII, 27
September 2016.
6 Warrant of Arrest, Al-Werfalli (ICC-01/11-01/17-2), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 15 August 2017, §§
11–22; Second Warrant of Arrest, Al-Werfalli (ICC-01/11-01/17-13), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 5
July 2018, §§ 17–18.
7 Decision on ‘Prosecution’s Fifth Request for the Admission of Evidence from the Bar Table’,
Bemba et al. (ICC-01/05-01/13-1524), Trial Chamber VII, 14 December 2015. See further,
Prosecution’s Fifth Request for the Admission of Evidence from the Bar Table, Bemba et al.
(ICC-01/05-01/13-1498), 30 November 2015, §§ 17–18.
8 See e.g. Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-finding Mission on the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, A/HRC/45/CRP.11, 15 September 2020; Report of the Detailed Findings of
the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Protests in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, UN Doc. A/HRC/40/CRP.2, 18 March 2019; Report of the Detailed Findings of the
Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen, UN Doc. A/HRC/45/CRP.7, 29
September 2020; Report of the Independent International Fact-finding Mission on Myanmar, UN
Doc. A/HRC/39/64, 18 September 2018.
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has been denied or is impossible for security or logistical reasons, open source
information can be an important source of lead, linkage, contextual and cor-
roborating evidence.9 The fact that this material can be obtained remotely also
helps minimize the risk to witnesses: instead of asking an individual or indi-
viduals to testify to the relationship between alleged perpetrators, or the de-
struction of cultural property, or the alleged commission of crimes, for
example, this may be shown through verifiable publicly available information.
The second major acknowledged advantage is open source information’s
democratizing potential, insofar as it provides an avenue through which or-
dinary people in affected regions can tell their stories and directly influence
international fact-finding processes.10 As Dyer and Ivens have noted, open
source investigations ‘can centre the experiences of groups whose voices are
too often heavily mediated, marginalised or excluded in conventional report-
ing’.11 As well as playing an important role in contemporary fact-finding
processes,12 citizen documentation of human rights violations online can
also help to counter disinformation and denialist propaganda by all actors
involved in a conflict, including powerful states.13
The third identified advantage to the use of digital open source information
in investigating international crimes is its relative objectivity. For example,
unlike a witness — and despite technical limitations — a satellite image can-
not forget salient facts, misremember key details, or be motivated by self-
interest or allegiance to a particular group. As such, it could be a means to
mitigate against ‘the frailties of human perceptions’14 and the well-
documented issue of witness credibility that have affected international crim-
inal trials for decades.15 In addition, open source information, particularly
citizen-generated photo and video content posted online, may reduce the
9 F. Abrahams and D. Murray, ‘Open Source Information: Part of the Puzzle’, in Dubberley,
Koenig and Murray (eds), supra note 2, 317; A. Koenig and L. Freeman, ‘Open Source
Investigations for Legal Accountability: Challenges and Best Practices’, in Dubberley, Koenig
and Murray (eds), supra note 2, 331, at 332–333.
10 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, A/HRC/29/37, 24 April 2015, § 39; M.K. Land, ‘Democratizing Human
Rights Fact-Finding’, in P. Alston and S. Knuckey (eds), The Transformation of Human Rights
Fact-Finding (Oxford University Press, 2016), 399, 402.
11 S. Dyer and G. Ivens, ‘What would a Feminist Open Source Investigation look like?’, 1 Digital
War (2020), https://doi.org/10.1057/s42984-020-00008-9, 1.
12 S. Gregory, ‘Ubiquitous Witnesses: Who Creates the Evidence and the Live(d) Experience of
Human Rights Violations?’ 18 Information, Communication and Society (2015) 1378; Irving,
supra note 3.
13 A. Geis and G. Schlag, ‘‘‘The Facts cannot be Denied’’: Legitimacy, War and the Use of
Chemical Weapons in Syria’, 7 Global Discourse (2017) 285; J. Deutch, ‘Challenges in
Codifying Events Within Large and Diverse Data Sets of Human Rights Documentation:
Memory, Intent, and Bias’, 14 International Journal of Communication (2020) 5055, at 5056.
14 Judgment, Kupreškić et al. (IT-95-16-A), Appeals Chamber, 23 October 2001, § 34.
15 N. Combs, Fact-Finding without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of International
Criminal Convictions (Cambridge University Press, 2010); S. De Smet, ‘Justified Belief in the
Unbelievable’, in Bergsmo and Stahn (eds), supra note 3, 81, at 128–129; Abrahams and
Murray, supra note 9, 324.







qab006/6214619 by guest on 20 M
ay 2021
need for intermediaries, whose role has been problematic in trial practice,16
insofar as open source materials can provide a direct link to witnesses and
survivors.
The authors recognize the potentially significant advantages associated with
using open source information, and believe that this form of information and
evidence should play a key role in future investigations. However, as investi-
gators increasingly turn to open source techniques, this article sounds a word
of caution against overlooking a number of biases and blind spots that can
hinder the utility of open source information in the investigation of inter-
national crimes. While it is true that open source information may be used
to indicate the potential commission of international crimes or to show net-
works between key actors, to prove the culpability of leaders and/or the exist-
ence of a plan or policy, it is likely that in most cases witness testimony
(particularly that of ‘insider’ witnesses) will still be needed. Open source infor-
mation should neither be viewed as a panacea, nor in a vacuum. Furthermore,
and as shall be shown in this article, while open source information has a
clearly democratizing potential, there is a risk that a rush towards greater
adoption of open source research methods in investigations may inadvertently
silence some of the most marginalized populations. In this article, we argue
that digital open source information can be as vulnerable to subjectivity and
bias as any other form of evidence.
Before turning to our analysis of where and when bias may emerge in digital
open source investigations, it is useful to define the term. While the ordinary
meaning of ‘bias’ links to a prejudice or particular bent,17 the scientific litera-
ture describes bias as, ‘[a]ny process at any stage of inference which tends to
produce results or conclusions that differ systematically from the truth’.18 In
the context of international criminal investigations, a bias can similarly be
described as any systematic distortion or error, due to a design problem, an
interfering factor, or a judgement, that can affect the conception, design, or
conduct of an investigation, or the collection, analysis, interpretation, presen-
tation, or discussion of the evidence.19
16 Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request for Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose
the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further
Consultations with the VWU, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2517-Red), Trial Chamber I, 8 July
2010; E. Haslam and R. Edwards, ‘Managing a New ‘‘Partnership’’: ‘‘Professionalization’’,
Intermediaries and the International Criminal Court’, 24 Criminal Law Forum (2013) 49.
17 The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘bias’ as, ‘An inclination, leaning, tendency, bent; a
preponderating disposition or propensity; predisposition towards; predilection; prejudice’.
18 D.L. Sackett, ‘Bias in Analytic Research’, 32 Journal of Chronic Diseases (1979) 51.
19 This definition is heavily influenced by the comprehensive definition of bias produced by
Aronson following a systematic review of definitions of ‘bias’ that have previously been pro-
posed in statistical, epidemiological, and sociological texts and an extraction of key themes from
those definitions: J. Aronson, ‘A Word about Evidence: 6. Bias – a proposed definition’, Catalogue
of Bias, 15 June 2018, available online at https://catalogofbias.org/2018/06/15/a-word-about-
evidence-6-bias-a-proposed-definition/ (visited 2 November 2020). Aronson’s definition is: ‘A
systematic distortion, due to a design problem, an interfering factor, or a judgement, that can
affect the conception, design, or conduct of a study, or the collection, analysis, interpretation,
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A considerable body of literature is dedicated to the hundreds of forms
of bias that can impact upon almost every aspect of human life, from
medicine,20 to education,21 to technology.22 The University of Oxford’s
‘Catalogue of Bias’, a project that maps and defines the main biases that
impact on research, defines over 60 different biases.23 For the purposes of
this article, we broadly categorize biases into two overarching categories: (i)
technical biases, which are biases linked to decisions made by computer
systems, and (ii) cognitive biases, which are systematic errors in thinking
or reasoning that impact upon human decision-making. Technical biases
become relevant when using technology to conduct fact-finding and ana-
lysis, while cognitive biases relate to how people perceive and make sense of
information.
In reality, these two broad categories are heavily intertwined, insofar as
human biases feed into machine biases, and vice versa.24 However, the most
common biases can be loosely defined as being either technical or cognitive
in nature. Within ‘technical’ bias, the following sub-categories are most
relevant:
• Access bias: The bias around who has access to the technologies and tools
needed for documenting events.25
• Algorithmic bias: The bias embedded in the design of algorithms and their use,
often due to already-biased training data.26 Algorithmic bias can impact
what results users see when they conduct a search, and the order in which
results are presented.
presentation, or discussion of outcome data, causing erroneous overestimation or underestima-
tion of the probable size of an effect or association.’
20 Sackett, supra note 18; D. Chavalarias and J.P. Ioannidis, ‘Science Mapping Analysis
Characterizes 235 Biases in Biomedical Research’, 63 Journal of Clinical Epidemiology (2010)
1205.
21 R.L. Linn and C.E. Werts, ‘Considerations for Studies of Test Bias’, 8 Journal of Educational
Measurement (1971) 1; C. Jencks, ‘Racial bias in testing’, in C. Jencks and M. Phillips
(eds), The Black–White test score gap (Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 55.
22 E.g. Z. Obermeyer et al., ‘Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm used to Manage the Health of
Populations’, 366 Science (2019) 447.
23 https://catalogofbias.org (visited 2 November 2020). See further, S. Tanveer, ‘Catalogue of Bias:
a resource review’, 9 November 2019, available online at https://s4be.cochrane.org/blog/2019/
05/09/catalogue-of-bias-a-resource-review/ (visited 2 November 2020).
24 Z. Rahman, ‘Tech Bias, People Bias’, The Engine Room, 11 December 2019, available online at
https://www.theengineroom.org/tech-bias-people-bias/ (visited 2 November 2020)
(‘Technology’s problems are not, and never have been, just about technology . . . problems
arise not ‘just’ due to technical mistakes but because of very human decision making, whether
that is a human trusting a machine over another human; poorly executed data analysis; or,
often, technology being built to reinforce human prejudices’).
25 Berkeley Protocol, supra note 2, 12.
26 E.g. M. Garcia, ‘Racist in the Machine: The Disturbing Implication of Algorithmic Bias’, 33
World Policy Journal (2016) 111; F. Zuiderveen Borgesius, Discrimination, Artificial Intelligence,
and Algorithmic Decision Making (Council of Europe, 2018).
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• Machine bias: The bias that arises from technical constraints or limitations in
the design process or computer tools.27 This might include, for example,
where an attempt is made to encode nuanced human experiences or con-
cepts into computer systems.28
• Emergent bias: Where the knowledge, values, or expertise of the users of a
product or system are different to those assumed or prioritized by the design-
ers of that product or system, creating difficulties in how the system is ac-
tually used.29
Cognitive bias refers to any distorted evaluation of information by humans.30
The following forms of cognitive bias are most prevalent:
• Anchoring: The tendency to rely too heavily on an initial piece of information
(or ‘anchor’) in later decisions in a way that causes the investigator to
discount, overvalue or misinterpret later information.31
• Automation bias: The tendency to defer to suggestions made by automated
decision-making systems, particularly in circumstances where a human
decision-maker would have reached a different conclusion.32
• Availability heuristic: The tendency to base decisions or conclusions on infor-
mation that can be easily accessed or brought to mind.33
• Confirmation bias: The tendency to search for or favour information that
supports one’s favoured hypotheses, while disregarding, avoiding or rejecting
information that counters them.34
• Groupthink: Defined as ‘a mode of thinking that people engage in when they
are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for
unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative
courses of action.’35 In other words, one person’s interpretation of the
27 B. Friedman and H. Nissenbaum, ‘Bias in Computer Systems’, 14 ACM Transactions on
Information Systems (1996) 330, at 335 (the authors use the term ‘technical bias’ for this
sub-category, but to avoid confusion with the overarching category, we have re-named it
‘machine bias’).
28 Ibid. See further, Institute of Technological Ethics, Three Kinds of Bias in Computer Systems,
available online at https://www.technologicalethics.org/three-kinds-of-bias (visited 5
November 2020).
29 Friedman and Nissenbaum, supra note 27, 335.
30 D. Simon, In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process (Harvard University Press,
2012), at 38.
31 A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’, 185 Science
(1974) 1124, at 1128: Participants were asked to spin a roulette wheel and then guess what
percentage of states in the United Nations were African nations. Those participants who
received 10 on the roulette wheel guessed 25%, on average, while the average guess for those
who landed on 65 was 45%.
32 R. Parasuraman and D.H. Manzey, ‘Complacency and Bias in Human Use of Automation: An
Attentional Integration’, 52 Human Factors (2010) 381.
33 Tversky and Kahneman, supra note 31, at 1127–1128.
34 R. Nickerson, ‘Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises’, 2 Review of
General Psychology (1998) 175.
35 I. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 9.
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data can influence that of others. This may also occur consequent to online
narratives.
• Information bias: Also called observation or measurement bias, information
bias is ‘any systematic difference from the truth that arises in the collection,
recall, recording and handling of information in a study.’36 Incomplete data
is a key cause of information bias.37
• Selection bias: When particular groups or individuals are over- or under-
represented in a study population, leading to a systematic error in extrap-
olating results to a broader population.38
While the above list is by no means a comprehensive overview of all possible
relevant biases, this article demonstrates how technical and cognitive biases
such as these can potentially permeate international criminal investigations
that use digital open source information. Section 2 outlines the risk of bias
affecting the evidence-gathering phase of investigations. Section 3 examines
how cognitive and technical biases may creep into international criminal
investigators’ analysis of open source information. Section 4 discusses means
to mitigate against these biases.
2. Biases in Gathering Open Source Information
Successful investigations are founded upon collecting and preserving a broad
range of reliable, relevant and probative evidence.39 However, in conducting
open source investigations, the ability to find information on all of the potential
international crimes committed in an area under investigation may be limited
by technical and cognitive biases in ways that ultimately hinder this objective.
A. Technical Biases
A digital open source investigation will typically involve querying Internet
search engines (such as Google or DuckDuckGo), as well as social media
platforms (such as Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat,40 Instagram, TikTok or
36 C.R. Bankhead, E.A. Spencer and D. Nunan, ‘Information Bias’, Catalogue of Bias, available
online at https://catalogofbias.org/biases/information-bias/ (visited 10 November 2020).
37 C.J. Howe, L.E. Cain and J.W. Hogan, ‘Are all Biases Missing Data Problems?’ 2 Current
Epidemiology Reports (2015) 162.
38 D.G. Kleinbaum, K.M. Sullivan and N.D. Barker, ‘Is There Something Wrong? Validity and
Bias’, in D.G. Kleinbaum, K.M. Sullivan and N.D. Barker, A Pocket Guide to Epidemiology
(Springer, 2007) 109.
39 Independent Expert Review of the International Criminal Court and the Rome Statute System: Final
Report, 30 September 2020, at 253–255; Office of the Prosecutor, OTP Strategic Plan 2019-
2021, § 14.
40 A guide to using Snapchat for these purposes is available online at https://citizenevidence.org/
2019/12/10/how-to-use-snapchat-to-monitor-breaking-events/ (visited 3 February 2021).
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Parler41).42 Each of these platforms and search engines rely on proprietary
algorithms that determine which search results are given priority. While the
algorithms and how they work are kept secret to protect commercial inter-
ests and prevent manipulation,43 they appear to be informed by factors like:
keyword matches; the number of views a page or piece of content has
already received (or number of followers for a social media profile); the
time of day it was posted; geographic location; and the searcher’s search
history.44 The voices that these algorithms amplify — for example, by priori-
tizing paid accounts, or websites or user profiles that already receive a lot
of traffic or have many followers (including media outlets) over smaller,
independent, websites or pages — may be informed by the power structures
in society and may in turn perpetuate the marginalization of less powerful
actors. Thus, each platform’s algorithm can lead to relevant material being
overlooked. A completely neutral search is not possible, even when the in-
vestigator is aware of the risk of algorithmic bias and takes steps to mitigate
against it, such as by deleting cookies before commencing their search;
deploying a virtual private network; setting up a ‘blank’ profile to conduct
searches that are free of influence from one’s personal search history, and
using diverse filters and search terms.45
New technologies are continually being developed to support open source
human rights investigators in discovering the most relevant open source evi-
dence, for example through the automated detection of particular weapons in
large caches of videos or photographs.46 While these are undoubtedly positive
developments, investigators should be aware of the risk posed by machine bias
when automating tasks, and vigilant as to the limitations of object detection
technologies in identifying the full range of international crimes documented
through open sources. As Koenig and Egan have noted, a dependence on
automation risks increasing ‘the tendency towards certain crimes becoming
hypervisible, such as chemical weapons attacks or the bombing of hospitals,
potentially drawing attention to those crimes like shiny objects, while
41 Since the time of writing Parler has been taken offline.
42 See e.g. P. Myers, ‘How to Conduct Discovery Using Open Source Methods’, in Dubberley,
Koenig and Murray (eds), supra note 2, 107.
43 J. Burrell, ‘How the Machine ‘‘Thinks’’: Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning
Algorithms’, 3 Big Data & Society (2016) 1, at 3–4.
44 D. Davies, ‘How Search Engine Algorithms Work: Everything You Need to Know’, Search Engine
Journal, 25 May 2020, available online at https://www.searchenginejournal.com/search-
engines/algorithms/#close (visited 9 November 2020).
45 See Berkeley Protocol, supra note 2, 11–12.
46 For example, VFRAME have developed object detection algorithms to identify cluster munitions,
Forensic Architecture have developed object detection algorithms to detect tear gas canisters,
and the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre and Foresnic Architecture used machine
learning to gather and present evidence of Russian military presence in Ukraine, for a submis-
sion to the European Court of Human Rights, as outlined online at https://ehrac.org.uk/news/
machine-learning-russian-military-presence-eastern-ukraine/ (visited 3 February 2021).
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detracting from other online information, such as that related to sexual vio-
lence, which may not as easily be captured by machines.’47
Emergent bias can also be an issue in evidence gathering processes, insofar
as social media platforms have become ‘accidental archives’ of human rights
documentation, contrary to platform creators’ initial expectations of how their
platforms would be used.48 For these reasons, there are inherent limitations
that can be problematic for open source investigators — for example, many
platforms and social messaging services erase the metadata from an image
when it is uploaded, which means that relevant information for investigators
(such as the time, date and location of creation) cannot be extracted from the
content itself.49 Moreover, because content is typically uploaded by members of
the public (not trained investigators), and often in situations of extreme stress,
they may not label or tag content in a way that makes it easily accessible for
investigators. For example, people may take to social media to discuss and
share recordings of an air strike on a hospital, but instead of outlining infor-
mation such as the precise location and specific details of the strike, they are
much more likely to use every day and exclamatory language (terms such as,
‘what just happened?!?’ or ‘holy shit!!’), in the local language. The fact that
users are documenting their lived experiences as the platforms intended — to
communicate with their peers — rather than deliberately documenting poten-
tial human rights violations, makes it very difficult for investigators to find the
content using typical search terms, such as ‘explosion’, ‘bomb’ or ‘air strike’.
B. Cognitive Biases
When conducting manual searches, the information available to an open
source investigator is necessarily circumscribed by the search terms they
use: a search can only return results in response to a specific query inputted
by the investigator. However, knowing what to look for, and what search
terms to use, is not always straightforward, and may result in information
bias. The most widely understood influence on the discovery phase of an
open source investigation is the language used. This can play out in a number
of ways. Most obviously, if an investigator is searching in a language that is
different from the primary language of those involved in an incident and
uploading content, only a subset of the total available content will be returned
as results. That being said, some uploaders may be aware that content in one
47 A. Koenig and U. Egan, ‘Hiding in Plain Site: Using Online Open Source Information to
Investigate Sexual Violence and Gender-Based Crimes’, in J. Dawes and A.S. Moore (eds),
Technologies of Human Rights Representation (SUNY Press, 2021).
48 J. Deutch, ‘Challenges in Codifying Events Within Large and Diverse Data Sets of Human Rights
Documentation: Memory, Intent, and Bias’, 14 International Journal of Communication (2020)
5055, at 5056.
49 For example, location information is turned off by default on Twitter, and metadata is scraped
from images on Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp. Of course, the camera-original content will
still retain metadata, if this can be tracked down: https://citizenevidence.org/2020/04/20/send
ing-encrypted-photos-while-preserving-metadata/ (visited 3 February 2021).
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of the most widely-spoken world languages may receive more attention and
may tag their posts accordingly, but to do so requires both a level of tech-
savviness and language skills that many people will not have, especially in
regions where education and mobility are limited.50
Being aware of the need to search for content in local languages, investiga-
tive teams typically incorporate people with relevant language skills or,
less ideally, use language translation software. This is not always sufficient,
however, and context-specific knowledge may also be required in order to
adequately locate and interpret content. It may be the case that uploaders
use local terminology that is unfamiliar to outsiders, even if they speak the
language. In the Gaza Strip, for example, ‘zenana’ (a slang Arabic term used to
refer to a nagging wife) is also the term typically used to refer to a drone.51 An
Arabic-speaking investigator who does not know this may not find relevant
information if their search terms are limited to formal terminology. Similarly,
Koenig and Egan have found that people often use coded language to refer to
sexual and gender-based violence.52 Contrary to popular belief, their research
indicates that information pertaining to such crimes was being shared online
(by survivors, perpetrators and bystanders), but that investigators were not
always aware of such practices and did not realize how to look for that
evidence.53
The fact that certain types of crime are more readily discoverable or more
overtly visible may lead to a form of selection bias, where the information that
is identified and used does not represent the broader situation.54
Representativeness and selection bias are common issues in investigations gen-
erally; in interviewing witnesses, for example, access to witnesses can be medi-
ated by gatekeepers or intermediaries, meaning that a full range of perspectives
may not be gathered through face-to-face interviews alone.55 In open source
investigations, in contrast, anybody with access to a mobile phone (and a data
plan) can theoretically share content online.56 In practice, however, we know
that access to technology and the internet is heavily mediated by financial,
50 J. Aronson, ‘Mobile Phones, Social Media and Big Data in Human Rights Fact-Finding:
Possibilities, Challenges, and Limitations’, in Alston and Knuckey (eds), supra note 10, 441.
See further, N. Milaninia, ’Biases in Machine Learning Models and Big Data Analytics’,
International Review of the Red Cross (forthcoming, 2021) online at https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼3744164 (visited 4 March 2021), 14 (noting that ’less than 0.1%
of the content on the Internet is in Pashto and 3% in Dari, the dominant languages in
Afghanistan’).
51 S. Wilson, ‘In Gaza, lives Shaped by Drones’, Washington Post, 3 December 2011; J. Cook,
‘Gaza: Life and Death under Israel’s Drones’, Al Jazeera, 28 November 2013.
52 Koenig and Egan, supra note 47.
53 Ibid.
54 S. Edwards, ‘Open Source Investigations for Human Rights: Current and Future Challenges’, in
Dubberley, Koenig and Murray (eds), supra note 2, 87, at 91–92.
55 OHCHR, Integrating a Gender Perspective into Human Rights Investigations (United Nations, 2018),
at 16–23.
56 Land, supra note 10; Dyer and Ivens, supra note 11; R.J. Hamilton, ‘User-Generated Evidence’,
57 Colombia Journal of Transnational Law (2018) 1.
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social, educational, technical, political, geographic and physical constraints,57
meaning that the same risks of selection bias and over-representation of certain
perspectives (e.g. those of digitally literate, young, urban, men) remain.
Relatedly, it is a truism that certain types of violation are more amenable to
open source documentation than others. Witnesses will often record and post
content relating to visible violations, such as murder, destruction of property,
and artillery or air strikes, but may not have access to other more ‘hidden’
atrocities, such as torture, ill-treatment of detainees or starvation.58
Where key hypotheses have been identified early in the evidence-gathering
process,59 cognitive shortcuts may lead the investigator to fall prey to confirm-
ation bias or anchoring — where later evidence discovered reinforces the
initial hypothesis, while contrary or exculpatory information is overlooked or
disregarded. Lidén has written convincingly of the increased susceptibility to
confirmation bias that can result from information overload and the limits of
human cognitive and processing capabilities.60 This risk is even greater in the
context of open source investigations, where the volume of content through
which investigators have to trawl to find the most relevant evidence can be
overwhelming.61 Aside from being a matter of investigative good practice,
overcoming confirmation bias is particularly important in the context of tribu-
nals such as the ICC, where there is an obligation ‘to investigate incriminating
and exonerating circumstances equally’, in order to establish the truth.62
57 Edwards, supra note 54, at 93; Y. Ng, ‘File Sharing and Communication During an Internet
Shutdown’, Witness blog, 31 January 2020, available online at https://blog.witness.org/2020/
02/file-sharing-communication-internet-shutdown/ (visited 19 November 2020); U. Egan,
‘Intersectionality and International Criminal Investigations in a Digital Age’, Opinio Juris, 19
December 2019, available online at http://opiniojuris.org/2019/12/19/digital-accountability-
symposium-intersectionality-and-international-criminal-investigations-in-a-digital-age/ (visited
19 November 2020).
58 Y. McDermott, D. Murray, and A. Koenig, ‘Whose Stories Get Told, and by Whom?
Representativeness in Open Source Human Rights Investigations’, Opinio Juris, 19 December
2019, available online at http://opiniojuris.org/2019/12/19/digital-accountability-symposium-
whose-stories-get-told-and-by-whom-representativeness-in-open-source-human-rights-investiga
tions/ (visited 19 November 2020). It should be noted that such content is often posted by
perpetrators, and so may be available,
59 As Agirre explains, investigations are an iterative process, and pretending to start with a ‘blank
canvas’ or a complete absence of hypotheses would be fallacious; it is better to acknowledge
them from the outset so that they can be tested and interrogated: X. Agirre Aranburu, ‘The
Contribution of Analysis to the Quality Control in Criminal Investigation’, in X. Agirre, M.
Bergsmo, S. De Smet and C. Stahn (eds), Quality Control in Criminal Investigation (TOAEP,
2020) 117, at 125 et seq.
60 M. Lidén, ‘Confirmation Bias in Investigations of Core International Crimes: Risk Factors and
Quality Control Techniques’, in Agirre, Bergsmo, De Smet and Stahn (eds), supra note 59, 461,
at 502.
61 M. Puttick, Eyes on the Ground: Realizing the Potential of Civilian-led Monitoring in Armed Conflict
(Ceasefire, 2017), at 24; Deutch, supra note 48, at 5055 (noting that, ‘For the conflict in Syria,
which began in 2011, there are more hours of user-generated content documenting rights
violations uploaded to digital platforms than there have been hours in the conflict itself.’)
62 Art. 54(1)(a) ICCSt.; Internal Rule 55(5) ECCC IR.
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This problem is often compounded when particular incidents receive a great
deal of public attention, and the same content related to these incidents is
shared and uploaded multiple times, potentially drowning out material related
to other incidents. In the course of our research interviews, several investiga-
tors expressed concern about open source information that depicted particu-
larly shocking incidents, such as attacks on children, being shared widely.
A significant amount of content related to a limited number of incidents
may drown out other incidents, making them less visible and less accessible
to investigators during the discovery phase. A reliance on the availability
heuristic can lead to systematic biases in an investigative plan, if these em-
blematic incidents, which may be the most readily retrievable from one’s mem-
ory, shape the investigation to the detriment of other incidents. Moreover,
there are limits to the utility of information relating one particularly shocking
incident in legal accountability processes, where the aim is, for example, to
demonstrate intent, or to show a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population.
Emblematic incidents can also affect the investigative process in a number of
other ways. First, there is a real risk that the digital environment will contam-
inate eyewitnesses’ memories, since witnesses’ perceptions of events can be
shaped by information they later learn about those events,63 negatively affecting
the accuracy or reliability of their testimony. Secondly, emblematic incidents
shared widely on social media can shape witnesses’ interactions with investiga-
tors, by giving rise to an expectation on the part of the witness that the inves-
tigator will want to hear about the emblematic incident, rather than other
incidents that they witnessed, but which they perceive to be less important.64
3. Biases in the Analysis of Open Source Information
Cognitive and technical biases not only emerge during the search or discovery
phase of an investigation, but also during analysis — the act of interpreting
discovered information, including assessing its meaning, reliability and proba-
tive value, and linking it to potential crimes within the jurisdiction of the
investigator. Given that technical and cognitive biases can interfere with
each stage of the investigation process, there is a very real risk that these
biases will compound at the analysis stage.
A. Technical Biases
In light of the enormous volume of digital open source information that can be
generated, tools that filter and categorize that information can be incredibly
helpful to investigators. For example, object detection software can sift through
63 E. Loftus et al., Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and Criminal (6th edn, LexisNexis, 2020) §§ 4–7[a];
Abrahams and Murray, supra note 9, at 324.
64 McDermott et al., supra note 58.
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huge masses of video evidence that have been collected from a region, to
identify potential matches for a specific object, such as a cluster munition.65
This can potentially save hundreds of analyst hours that would otherwise be
spent viewing all the videos in the dataset. Other tools may use facial recog-
nition technology to help investigators identify key perpetrators or actors in a
collected set of images,66 while a number of tools are in development which
aim to detect incitement or hate speech.67
Aside from the risk of automation bias, where the results given by such auto-
mated tools are perceived as more accurate than human analysis,68 investigators
should be mindful of the presence of algorithmic bias. Underlying algorithms are
informed by training data, and that data may have inherent biases or discrimin-
ation that the investigator may be unaware of. For example, facial recognition
algorithms tend to be trained on large datasets of celebrities, which means that
the lack of diversity in Hollywood may produce a racially biased model.69
Similarly, the datasets used to train hate speech detection tools may reflect key
terms and phrases at the time that the data was collected, but given that lan-
guage is ever evolving, and hate speech is inherently context-dependent, these
tools are likely to overlook newer terms or phrases.70 This is illustrated by the use
of memes in China, which mock officials or official policy, but are designed to
evade Internet censorship.71 Equally, and as noted above, there is a risk that the
availability of certain tools will focus investigators’ attention on potential viola-
tions discoverable by these tools, at the expense of other violations.72
B. Cognitive Biases
As established above, cognitive biases ‘result from . . . subconscious mental
procedures for processing information’.73 These biases are ‘simplifying
65 K. Hao, ‘Human Rights Activists want to use AI to Help Prove War Crimes in Court’, MIT Tech
Review, 25 June 2020, available online at https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/25/
1004466/ai-could-help-human-rights-activists-prove-war-crimes/ (visited 18 January 2021).
66 For example, the OSR4Rights project has developed ‘Facesearch’, a face matching tool enabling
human rights investigators to locate whether the same person appears in a collection of images.
67 See, for example, Hatebase, ‘How it works’, available online at https://hatebase.org/how_it_
works (visited 20 November 2020); HADES, the hate speech detection tool in development by
the OSR4Rights project; E & T, ‘AI Tools could Consider Context when Detecting Hate Speech’,
24 February 2020, available online at https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2020/02/ai-
tools-could-consider-context-when-detecting-hate-speech/ (visited 20 November 2020).
68 See above, text to note 32.
69 ODSC, ‘The Impact of Racial Bias in Facial Recognition Software’, Medium, 15 December 2018.
70 V. Ikoro, ‘Learning to Detect Hate Speech Better: An Investigation of the Contribution of
FastText and Hatebase Features’ (Working Paper, 2020, on file with authors).
71 K. Keng Kuek Ser, ‘Want to Circumvent China’s Great Firewall? Learn these 9 Phrases First’,
The World, 20 July 2015; A. Abad-Santos, ‘How Memes Became the Best Weapon Against
Chinese Internet Censorship’, The Atlantic, 4 June 2013.
72 See text to notes 46 and 47 above.
73 R.J. Heuer, Jr, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), available online
at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-mono
graphs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/art12.html (visited 20 November 2020).
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strategies and rules of thumb to ease the burden of mentally processing infor-
mation to make judgments and decisions’ that can lead to ‘mental errors’.74
On the positive side, such biases often result in errors that are consistent and
predictable thanks to the fact that many of these biases have been the subject
of intensive psychological research, and thus can be accounted for. While
simple awareness is often not enough to counter the likelihood that cognitive
biases influence analysis, their consistency and predictability mean that inves-
tigators can create protocols to help safeguard against common errors (as
discussed in greater detail in Section 4 below). Cognitive biases are also a
feature of traditional ‘offline’ investigations, but — as discussed below —
open source investigations raise a number of new issues.
The anchoring bias can play an especially critical and distorting role during
the interpretation of digital open source information. The first cognitive or
affective impression created through the analysis of images found online, for
example, can be difficult to reverse and can easily impact later interpretation of
visual assets. If the investigator has a dominant interpretation of a related
event from early online searching or through other sources, there is a very
real risk that the investigator will interpret the visuals in ways that conform to
their initial perspective.
Importantly, despite their perceived objectivity, subjective considerations are
needed to make sense of visual and other sensory information.75 As explained
by researchers Malcolm, Groen and Bakr, ‘the diagnostic value of a visual property
depends on a combination of the current goal and prior experience of the obser-
ver, as well as its availability within the scene and relationship to other proper-
ties’.76 What we perceive is not the product of passive experience, but ultimately a
construction of reality.77 During the analysis process, ‘we tend to perceive what
we expect to perceive’.78 This is especially true of visual information, such as
videos, which are commonly relied upon in open source analysis. Humans have
a tendency to value and weigh sensory information — such as information that
incorporates sight and sound — more heavily than abstract information, such as
numbers or statistics. As has repeatedly been established, ‘A . . . single, vivid case
[often] outweighs a much larger body of statistical evidence or conclusions
reached by abstract reasoning.’79 Given this, a widely circulated video of an
atrocity may readily drown out other, less emotive and less visceral information,
such as physical evidence or traditional documents, even when the weight of
competing evidence points away from what a video apparently depicts.
74 Ibid., at 111. Cognitive limitations cause people to employ various simplifying strategies and
rules of thumb to ease the burden of mentally processing information to make judgments and
decisions.
75 See e.g. G.L. Malcolm, I.I.A. Groen and C.I. Bakr, ‘Making Sense of Real-World Scenes’, 20
Trends in Cognitive Science (2016) 843.
76 Ibid.
77 Heuer, supra note 73, chapter 2.
78 Ibid.
79 Heuer, supra note 73, chapter 10.
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While videos are typically perceived as objective representations of an event,
authors of one study found that ‘the ways in which people watch video, as
well as the vividness of the format itself, may [actually] encourage biased
decision-making’.80 For example, numerous studies have established that
observers of video evidence can also reach very different conclusions about
what the video depicts, who should be punished, and how harshly, depending
on the viewer’s identity, including group affiliation — such as race or gender
— and based on who they identify with in the video, if anyone.
Associational biases, especially implicit associational biases that rely on ster-
eotypes — such as associations between race and perceived rates of criminality
— can also be dangerous influences on the interpretation of digital open
source information. In a relatively recent study that looked into associational
biases and juror interpretations of police body camera footage, the researchers
concluded that ‘while body cameras can help provide evidence in credibility
battles between opposing witnesses, they are dangerous because they give a
narrow perspective of an encounter that may simply reinforce the implicit
biases of those who watch the video’.81 As pointed out by the authors,
‘what any viewer sees is ‘‘influenced by the viewer’s cultural, demographic,
social, political, and ideological characteristics’’’.82
Investigators are similarly known to be biased in ways that lead to them
perceiving cause and effect between data points even when such connections
do not exist. This is due to the human propensity to seek order and meaning in
the world. Investigators and other fact-finders are vulnerable to creating men-
tal stories that provide coherence between information found online — even
when the coherence is a fallacy.83 Thus, investigators may fall victim to the
very human tendency to build a coherent narrative that ‘makes sense’ of
disparate data points that are in fact random, developing false narratives
that are ‘internally consistent as well as consistent with the available evi-
dence’,84 but nevertheless inaccurate.
Even the apparently objective act of storing information can reflect the
politics, perceptions and biases of the individual investigator, through the fil-
enames, data categories and/or tags they choose in preserving and archiving
evidence.85 For example, a video showing violence against protestors may be
stored in an archive of evidence using any of the following terms: ‘police
brutality’; ‘disproportionate force’, ‘violence against protestors’, ‘attack’, ‘police
80 Y. Granot et al., ‘In the Eyes of the Law: Perception versus reality in appraisals of video
evidence’, 24 Psychology, Public Policy, and the Law (2018) 93.
81 M.A. Birck, ‘Do You See What I See? Problems with Juror Bias in Viewing Body-Camera Video
Evidence’, 24 Michigan Journal of Race and Law (2018) 153, at 157.
82 Ibid. (quoting H.M. Wasserman, ‘Moral Panics and Body Cameras’, 92 Washington University
Law Review (2015) 831).
83 See e.g. N. Pennington and R. Hastie, ‘Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for
Juror Decision Making’, 62 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (1992) 189.
84 Heuer, supra note 73, chapter 11.
85 J. Deutch and H. Habal, ‘The Syrian Archive: A Methodological Case Study of Open-Source
Investigation of State Crime Using Video Evidence from Social Media Platforms’, 7 State Crime
Journal (2018) 46, at 46.
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suppress riot’ or ‘police re-establish control’. Each of those terms has its own
weight and meaning and reflect the subjective views of the person storing and
indexing the information. On the other hand, a dispassionate and detached
description (such as, ‘person falls to the ground’) can be meaningless and may
lead to the evidence being overlooked in later reviews.
4. Mitigating Biases in Open Source Investigations of
International Crimes
As mentioned above, simple awareness of the technical and cognitive biases
that can impact upon the discovery and analysis of open source information
cannot, of itself, alleviate such biases. However, awareness that biases can
distort the information identification and analysis process86 is a crucial first
step in designing effective counter-strategies.
The psychological and practitioner literatures provide many potentially use-
ful tools and techniques that should form a crucial part of the open source
investigator’s toolkit. In this section, we discuss some of the strategies identified
in those literatures that can be integrated into investigators’ workflows to
mitigate the impact of bias. We organize this section around three key cate-
gories of bias touched on above: access bias, algorithmic bias and cognitive
bias.
With regards to access bias, having a clear investigative plan that takes into
account the ‘blind spots’ of open source information outlined in Section 2
above, will help investigators overcome, or mitigate against, informational
gaps.87 A good example of this can be found in the report of the independent
international Commission of Inquiry on the 2018 protests in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory.88 Given that women and girls were, generally speak-
ing,89 less likely to have participated in the demonstrations than men and
boys, the harms they suffered were less visible in the numerous open source
videos and photographs which tended to depict the killing or injury of civilians.
However, the Commission noted that the ‘low proportion of women and girls
injured and killed compared to men and boys should be understood within the
prevalent social context in Gaza’:90 in this context, the absence of open source
86 Often referred to as the ‘discovery’ process.
87 For a sample investigation plan and technical landscape assessment, see Berkeley Protocol,
supra note 2, annexes I and III.
88 Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Protests
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, UN Doc. A/HRC/40/CRP.2, 18 March 2019.
89 One notable exception was the killing of Dr Rouzan Al-Najjar, as expertly documented by
Forensic Architecture and the New York Times: see D.M. Halbfinger, ‘A Day, a Life: When a
Medic was Killed in Gaza, Was It an Accident?’ New York Times, 30 December 2018, available
online at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/30/world/middleeast/gaza-medic-israel-shooting.
html (visited 20 November 2020). The Commission of Inquiry outlined over 300 injuries to
women, through live ammunition, tear gas, rubber coated metal bullets and shrapnel: ibid., §
591.
90 Ibid., § 592.
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information should not necessarily indicate an absence of harm. In response,
the COI took additional steps to examine the gendered impact of violations, for
example women’s disproportionate accumulation of debt, the added burden of
breadwinning and/or caregiving for the wounded, and increased incidence of
domestic violence.91 An awareness of the intersectional factors that can lead to
relative invisibility in digital spaces and identification of other ways in which
relevant information may be documented — for example verbally, or in non-
digital documentary form, or through physical evidence — can go a long way
in encouraging investigators to dig deeper and ensure a full representation of a
broad cross-section of impacted communities.92
As for algorithmic bias, including the possibility that online searches will
favour results from particular parts of the world (as with the bias of social
media platforms in producing information from the global north and west)
or relevant to particular populations, investigators should conduct a digital
landscape assessment prior to commencing any collection or monitoring.93
Such assessments require the investigator to methodically document the online
sources (including social media sites) used in the relevant jurisdiction(s). This
information should be farther parsed with an eye to how use of the internet,
including social media sites, and other digital technologies varies on the basis
of age, gender and rural and urban divides, among other demographic factors.
Templates and protocols that force investigators to plan and structure their
searches can help with consciously expanding the sources they use for infor-
mation collection in ways that may counteract both algorithmic and cognitive
biases.
Algorithmic bias can also distort information discovery, collection and ana-
lysis when digital tools are used to conduct analytic tasks at scale — for
example, when facial recognition technologies are used to identify potential
persons of interest from enormous datasets that humans are incapable of
combing, but which prove more accurate for identifying white versus black
faces (making the risk of misidentification especially acute for people of colour).
First, it’s important for investigators to understand the biases that may be
prevalent in the data used to train the tool. Secondly, the investigator may
want to create ‘weights’ to help counter those biases (i.e. by reducing the
likelihood threshold when searching for bias-affected categories of persons),
or complement automated processes with human review — using the tool
to bring the dataset down to human scale but then conducting an independent
analysis of the resulting dataset.
Ideally, such automated tools are used in ways that complement human
weaknesses (such as limitations on humans’ abilities to review hundreds of
thousands of hours of video, as experienced, for example, with the Syrian
conflict). Of course, investigators must be careful to avoid known biases that
91 Ibid., §§ 603–614.
92 Egan, supra note 57.
93 For a digital landscape assessment template that spotlights relevant categories of information,
see Berkeley Protocol, supra note 2, Annex III, at 85.
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come with using digital methods; research has found that digital outputs,
despite best efforts at independence, may be given undue weight.94 This has
the impact of distorting or biasing researchers’ allegedly ‘independent’ conclu-
sions in favour of the results proposed by automated tools.
To counter both the machine and human biases noted above, international
criminal investigators may also wish to adopt some of the following processes
that have been found to help offset human error. These include establishing
evidence review panels to ‘stress test’ the evidence and the strength of any
working hypotheses,95 appointing a ‘devil’s advocate’ or ‘red team’ to chal-
lenge the arguments, or build competing hypotheses that can be tested against
the collected evidence.96 It is especially important that investigators document
and report any assumptions that have been used in reaching analytical con-
clusions, which helps with external review. ‘Evidence Review Boards’ can also
prove helpful: they are groups of senior colleagues whose role is to assess the
case as a whole based on the evidence gathered, and on that basis determine
whether the case can proceed to the filing of charges, or whether further
investigation or amendment of the proposed charges is warranted.97 These
measures can help to overcome cognitive biases by incorporating the perspec-
tives of analysts with some degree of distance from the investigative team.
As Heuer notes: ‘[analysts conducting evidence review] often see things or
ask questions that the author has not seen or asked. Because they are not
so absorbed in the substance, they are better able to identify the assumptions
and assess the argumentation, internal consistency, logic, and relationship of
the evidence to the conclusion’.98
Co-authors with experience in running open source investigation and
verification labs in universities incorporate these methods through systems of
peer review, similarly analysing multiple working hypotheses (even charting
or writing out all facts that support each hypothesis), and testing the null
hypothesis — essentially, seeing if they can disprove the favoured working
hypothesis or hypotheses. This allows them to question not only conclusions
with regards to the ‘five Ws’ (who, what, when, where, and why), but also
clearly assert how we know each fact to be true, to see if there may be prob-
lematic analytical gaps or assumptions that have created blind spots in our
analysis.
Such peer review can also assist with a related mechanism for identifying
and compensating for blind spots: ensuring that diverse investigators with
different cultural schema and individual perspectives have a chance to review
and analyse the evidence. Given research that establishes how peoples’
94 J.M. Logg, J.A. Minson and D.A. Moore, ‘Algorithm Appreciation: People Prefer Algorithmic To
Human Judgment’, 151 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (2019) 90.
95 M. Bergsmo, Towards a Culture of Quality Control in Criminal Investigations, FICHL Policy Brief
Series No. 94 (2019), at 4.
96 Agirre, supra note 59, at 257–259. See also Heuer, supra note 73, at 97, for a ‘Step-by-Step
Outline of Analysis of Competing Hypotheses’.
97 Agirre, supra note 59, at 259–272; Heuer, supra note 73, chapter 14.
98 Heuer, supra note 73, chapter 14.
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identities influence and thus bias their interpretation of collected data — and
especially visual data, such as the photographs and videos common to digital
open source investigations — ensuring that investigators bring diverse perspec-
tives to the collection and analysis of relevant information can serve as a
helpful check on the quality of the investigation.
Also critical is engaging in known processes for verifying open source mate-
rials — specifically, testing what the investigator has been told the item rep-
resents and/or what the investigator believes it represents — by consistently
following a three-step process. On every piece of original data (such as a
photograph or video) the investigator should conduct (i) a technical analysis
(seeing if the item has any metadata attached, such as geocoordinates or
timestamps, that can serve as a lead for further verification), (ii) content ana-
lysis (comparing landmarks and other visual information in the item against
other sources such as satellite imagery or reliable photographs or videos to see
if that information is consistent with the asserted place, time, etc.) and (iii)
source analysis (evaluating the reliability of the source for the information that
the item represents).99
A now-infamous video called ‘Syrian Hero Boy’ illustrates the importance of
consistently engaging in these three steps, including — and especially —
source analysis. In 2014, an online video went viral that purported to show
a young boy in Syria rescuing a young girl from where she was trapped during
an active shooting. Several media outlets shared the video as a heartwarming
story of bravery and kindness in the context of a horrific war. However, several
media outlets declined to amplify the video, expressing scepticism of its au-
thenticity. Ultimately, the latter were right to be sceptical: it was later revealed
that the incident had been staged on the Gladiator film set in Malta.100 The
director had shot the video and posted it online, positioning it as factual, as
part of an attempt to bring broader global attention to the horrors of the
Syrian war and inspire international aid. One relatively common difference
between those who declined to show the video and those who did was that
the former engaged in the third step in the verification process: source analysis.
They were unable to find more than one video from the source, which was
unusual for documenters in Syria, or to find any clear information about the
source’s offline identity, which called the source’s reliability into question. This
case is ultimately a particularly excellent example of poor forensic analysis,
with one BBC reporter stating (based on content analysis) that the one thing
that could be conclusively determined was that the film was shot in Syria —
which of course, was not accurate.
As for content analysis, investigators can and should use a variety of meth-
ods to check whether what’s depicted or otherwise included in the data is
consistent with what they’ve been told and/or with their working hypothesis.
99 Berkeley Protocol, supra note 2, 63–68.
100 See e.g. ‘#BBCTrending: Syrian ‘Hero Boy’ Video Faked by Norwegian Director’, BBC, 14
November 2014, available online at https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-30057401
(visited 2 February 2021).
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For example, if a video is allegedly of a particular incident in a particular
village in Myanmar in 2017: is the video’s content consistent with what
one would have seen in 2017, at the alleged location in Myanmar? Equally,
if a video claims to have been taken during the coronavirus pandemic, are
people wearing face masks? Common verification practices include conducting
a reverse image search of any photo (or stills, if a video) to see if the visuals
have been graphed by one or more search engines and if so, if the information
surrounding that image is consistent with the hypothesis; checking to see
whether built or natural landmarks are consistent with what can be found
in satellite imagery from that location and time, etc.101
Triangulation with other data types is also helpful for challenging one’s
working hypothesis. At a minimum, open source research methods should
always be used in conjunction with other investigative methods to help
counter the technical and cognitive biases endemic to digital research, with
investigators aiming for diverse physical, documentary and testimonial evi-
dence for each fact at issue in their case. This may be, for example, through
complementing open source information with information gathered through
witnesses, local networks or other means to capture the perspectives of margi-
nalized populations. Some investigators use open source tools, such as satellite
imagery, to supplement their more traditional investigative activities. One not-
able example of this is the use of satellite imagery to trace the actual journey
that witnesses described in their interviews with investigators. In this way,
open source tools can pave the way for an investigation underpinned by ‘rad-
ical empathy’, or the ability to understand and appreciate another person’s
standpoint or experiences, and allow that perspective to prevail over one’s
personal reaction or feelings.102 This method can also be a means to check
the credibility of a witness’s account, for example if the journey they described
varies inexplicably and significantly from the route visible in satellite imagery
taken at around the same time.103
Finally, investigators should be mindful of shifting perceptions of what con-
stitutes ‘good’ evidence in the digital age.104 Several investigators we consulted
in our research were concerned that the growing salience of open source
information in mass atrocity investigations may undermine the perceived value
of witness testimony.105 One investigator we interviewed noted that those
parts of an investigation that are overwhelmingly testimony-based are per-
ceived as having less weight. In a Keynesian sense, that is correct, given
101 For more on verification, see A. Toler, ‘How to Verify and Authenticate User-Generated
Content’, in Dubberley, Koenig and Murray (eds), supra note 2, 185.
102 M.L. Caswell and M. Cifor, ‘From Human Rights to Feminist Ethics: Radical Empathy in the
Archives’, 81 Archivaria (2016) 23, at 25. See also, Amnesty International, ‘The Hidden US
War in Somalia’, 19 March 2019, at 40–43.
103 It is possible to view historical satellite imagery using DigitalGlobe (now Maxar) and other
satellite imagery sites. This means that, even if a route has changed over time (e.g. a road has
collapsed due to flooding or an earthquake), it should still be possible to view what that route
looked like at around the same time as events described.
104 McDermott et al., supra note 56.
105 Ibid.
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that the quantum of total evidence is lower.106 However, this perception is
problematic in the hierarchies it creates — both between the violations that
tend to be more grounded in testimony and those that are more typically
visible in open source information, and between the organizations that have
the skills and capacity to collect and analyse open source information and
those that do not. International criminal investigators should push back
against this facet of the new advocacy environment, underscoring the con-
tinuing importance of traditional investigative methods, especially when car-
ried out in conjunction with digital fact-finding. Academics and the third
sector also have a role in ensuring a more level playing field amongst human
rights organizations, through collaboration and meaningful partnership, know-
ledge transfer, training and the democratization of the open source investiga-
tive space by sharing open source technology and sharing knowledge,
experience and methods.
5. Conclusion
Digital open source information is emerging as a critical tool in the toolkit of
international criminal investigators. While the international community is in-
creasingly embracing the potential of digital information and open source
methods to strengthen fact-finding and verification, it is important to simul-
taneously acknowledge such processes’ weak spots and the potential for bias to
impact upon the collection and analysis of such information. In this article, we
have highlighted some key technical and cognitive biases that can impact
upon digital open source investigations. These include the risk of access bias
determining where and from whom digital open source information comes
from; algorithmic bias shaping search results and the analysis and filtering
of information gathered; and cognitive biases leading to systematic errors in
the gathering or interpretation of information. These findings are relevant not
just to the specific context of international criminal investigations, but to any-
one (for example, journalists, academic researchers, or investigators of domes-
tic crimes) seeking to use digital open source information to establish and
prove relevant facts.
Thankfully, with careful attention to the abundant research that has been
conducted into the technical and cognitive biases, and through carefully
designed investigations (and investigation teams) to minimize those weak-
nesses, international criminal investigators should be able to overcome those
hurdles. In so doing, they can ensure that digital open source information
realizes its full potential to strengthen justice and accountability for the world’s
most grave crimes.
106 Keynes defined ‘weight’ as ‘the amount of evidence upon which each probability is founded’:
J.M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (Macmillan, 1921), at 356.
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